Fault Current Detection and Dangerous Voltages in DC Urban Rail Traction Systems by Pons, Enrico et al.
Politecnico di Torino
Porto Institutional Repository
[Article] Fault Current Detection and Dangerous Voltages in DC Urban Rail
Traction Systems
Original Citation:
Pons, Enrico; Tommasini, Riccardo; Colella, Pietro (2017). Fault Current Detection and Dangerous
Voltages in DC Urban Rail Traction Systems. In: IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRY
APPLICATIONS, vol. 53 n. 4, pp. 4109-4115. - ISSN 0093-9994
Availability:
This version is available at : http://porto.polito.it/2679613/ since: September 2017
Publisher:
IEEE
Published version:
DOI:10.1109/TIA.2017.2692202
Terms of use:
This article is made available under terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Article
("Public - All rights reserved") , as described at http://porto.polito.it/terms_and_conditions.
html
Porto, the institutional repository of the Politecnico di Torino, is provided by the University Library
and the IT-Services. The aim is to enable open access to all the world. Please share with us how
this access benefits you. Your story matters.
(Article begins on next page)
1Fault Current Detection and Dangerous Voltages in
DC Urban Rail Traction Systems
Enrico Pons, Member, IEEE Riccardo Tommasini, Member, IEEE and Pietro Colella, Member, IEEE
Dipartimento Energia - Politecnico di Torino
Torino, 10129, ITALY
Email: enrico.pons@polito.it
Abstract—In this paper the electrical safety of DC urban
traction systems is analysed, with particular focus on fault
current detection and on dangerous voltages which could arise in
case of fault. For the discussion the tram network of Turin, Italy,
is used as a case study. Firstly the structure of the DC traction
power supply is described, analysing in detail the different
components; then the safety of the system is analysed, examining
possible types of fault. In particular, ground faults inside the
substation and ground faults along the line are analysed in detail.
Fault currents and dangerous voltages are calculated thanks to
a simplified steady-state circuital model of the traction system.
Finally, the consequent risks for the people are examined and
some conclusions and possible solutions are presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
Urban DC traction systems are common mass transport
systems employed in many towns worldwide. The terminology
used to identify them may vary, the most common terms being:
light rail, street car, tram or trolley. We can consider these
terms as synonyms.
The Traction Electrification System (TES) for trams is
usually constituted by:
• power substations, containing transformers, AC/DC con-
verters and protective devices;
• an Overhead Contact System (OCS);
• positive feeder cables, connecting the OCS with the
positive busbars in the substations;
• negative return conductors, collecting the return current
from the rails and bringing it back to the negative busbar
in the substation.
The difficulty of protection of DC urban tram systems was
studied by the authors in a previous work [1] and is due
to the problem of distinguishing a fault current from the
currents related to the normal operation, mainly because of
the following factors:
• fault currents can be small, due to high impedance ground
faults, or due to the position of the fault, which can
happen along the line and far away from the substation;
• the tram networks were designed for trams driven by DC
motors. Modern trams are instead driven by asynchronous
motors, fed by the DC OCS through IGBT DC/AC con-
verters; these trams have completely different absorbed
current profiles during acceleration and much higher peak
values;
• in standard heavy rail systems the lines are divided in
straight sections, and in each section, for safety reasons,
only a few trains are allowed to run at the same time; in
urban tram systems, instead, the network is meshed, and
also the sections are meshed: many trams can be running
at the same time inside the same section, resulting in
higher currents and complex current profiles in normal
operation.
For these reasons, using standard protection principles, such
as instantaneous and time-delayed over-current protections
is not sufficient. Different studies have been performed on
innovative protection schemes for TES [2], [3], but are mainly
focused on railway systems that, as said before, are quite
different from tram systems.
Moreover, the risk due to electric hazards in these tram
systems, running along public urban streets, is higher than in
normal rail systems running on separate rights of way, without
public access and with mostly straight sections [4], because
of the presence of the public in strict contact with the TES,
possibly exposed to dangerous voltages in case of fault.
In Europe the main requirements for what concerns electri-
cal safety in traction systems are provided by Standards EN
50122-1 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Electrical
safety, earthing and the return circuit. Part 1: Protective
provisions against electric shock [5] and EN 50122-2 Railway
applications - Fixed installations - Electrical safety, earthing
and the return circuit. Part 2: Provisions against the effects of
stray currents caused by d.c. traction systems [6]. The main
problems covered in these Standards are:
• protective provisions against indirect contact and imper-
missible rail potential;
• stray currents and rail to earth conductance.
The two objectives of reducing both stray currents and
dangerous voltages in case of fault are contrasting, and the
results depend on the choices regarding the grounding of the
different elements of the TES [7], [8].
Object of this paper is the analysis of the electrical safety
of DC urban traction systems, with particular focus on fault
current detection and on the dangerous voltages which could
arise in case of fault. For the discussion the tram network of
Turin, Italy, is used as a case study.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: firstly, in
Section II, the structure of the DC traction power supply is
described, with reference, in particular, to the Turin tram net-
work; then the safety of the system is analyzed in Section III,
examining possible types of fault, fault currents, dangerous
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Fig. 1. Power substation for DC traction.
voltages and consequent risks for the people. A simplified
circuital model of the system is presented in Section IV.
Finally, the results are described in Section V and some
conclusions are presented.
II. STRUCTURE OF THE DC TRACTION POWER SUPPLY
Fig. 1 presents the typical scheme of a substation feeding the
DC traction system. MV cables connect the substation to the
rest of the urban MV distribution network. A double secondary
transformer lowers the voltage to 470 V and feeds a 12 pulse
rectifier. The output nominal voltage is 600 V DC.
Each substation can feed 6 or 7 OCS zones: every zone is
fed through positive cables and is protected by an extra-rapid
DC circuit breaker. The over-current settings of the circuit
breakers can vary in the range between 3000 A and 4500 A,
depending on the size of the zone and on the forecasted
number of vehicles in it.
The negative cables allow the current return to the rectifier,
connecting it to the rails. While the OCS is divided in zones,
and each zone is fed by only one substation at a time, the
rails and negative cables constitute a unique meshed city-
wide network. The negative cables are not connected to
the substation grounding system, in order to limit the stray
currents dispersed by the rails into the ground.
In the tram network in Turin, the positive feeder and
negative cables have a typical cross section of 1000 mm2
(1974 kcmil), while the OCS has a cross section of 95 mm2
(187 kcmil).
III. SAFETY OF DC TRACTION SYSTEMS
Different types of faults can happen on the DC urban rail
traction systems, among which (Fig. 2):
1) ground fault in the substation; it can happen because
of a fault on the DC side of the converter or in the
DC switchboard, involving the exposed conductive parts
(ECPs) that are connected to the grounding system of
the substation;
2) short circuit in the substation;
3) fault to a pole (to ground) along the line; the fault to
a pole in the tram system is very unlikely, as all the
elements used to hold up the the OCS are made of
insulating materials (e.g. parafil ropes), but if the fault
happens it constitutes a ground fault because the poles
are not connected to each other and are not connected
to the return circuit;
4) short circuit along the line (can happen on a vehicle
or through a metallic structure connected to the return
circuit);
5) ground fault along the line (can happen on a vehicle).
When a short circuit happens in the substation, the fault
current magnitude will be high enough to make the extra-
rapid circuit breaker trip. But in case the short circuit happens
outside the substation, for example on a vehicle, or in case a
ground fault happens, the current would be limited by the
circuit resistances, resulting in a current comparable with
normal operation ones. In this case dangerous voltages can
last for long periods without any maximum current protection
intervention. For this reason new, and more sophisticated,
relays are being installed, and should be properly set in
order to recognize fault currents. An interesting possibility,
that needs to be studied in detail, is the setting of a rate-
of-rise threshold for the overcurrent protection. This rate-of-
rise threshold must be properly optimized in order to reduce
as much as possible nuisance tripping and to expand fault
detection range [9].
In general, the workers can be subject to risk of electric
shock inside the substation, and people outside the substation,
in case a fault is not recognized and interrupted in a time
interval shorter than that allowed by Standard EN 50122-1
section 9.3.2.2 [5]. The maximum permissible effective touch
voltages Ute,max in d.c. traction systems as a function of
time duration are reported in Table I. As it can be seen, if
the circuit breaker does not trip, the maximum permissible
effective touch voltage is 120V . If, instead, the circuit breaker
recognizes the fault and trips, permissible voltages must be
analyzed depending on the fault duration (i.e. on the magnitude
of the fault current and on the circuit breaker characteristic trip
curve).
For short-term conditions Standard EN 50122-1 considers
an additional resistance of 1000 Ω for the calculation of
the effective touch voltage. This assumption considers the
presence of shoes and, moreover, that the probability of danger
is very small within time intervals of less than 1 s. For this
reason, if the time duration of the fault is below 0.7 s the
permissible effective touch voltages are much higher.
In this paper the focus is on ground faults, inside the
substation (fault 1) and along the line (fault 5).
The other types of faults presented in Fig. 2 are not
considered in this work, for the following reasons:
• fault 2, the short circuit inside the substation, will cer-
tainly trigger the extra-rapid circuit breaker;
• fault 3, the fault to a pole along the line, can be considered
equivalent to fault 5, which is analyzed here;
• fault 4, a distant bolted fault, should produce a fault
current high enough to trigger the extra-rapid circuit
breaker. In case of arcing faults the current magnitude
could be smaller than the setting of the extra-rapid circuit
breaker. This case is however complicated, and requires
a dedicated study.
3Fig. 2. Possible faults on DC traction systems.
TABLE I
MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE EFFECTIVE TOUCH VOLTAGES Ute,max IN D.C.
TRACTION SYSTEMS AS A FUNCTION OF TIME DURATION
t Ute, max Ute, max
long-term short-term
s V V
> 300 120 -
300 150 -
1 160 -
0.9 165 -
0.8 170 -
0.7 175 -
< 0.7 - 350
0.6 - 360
0.5 - 385
0.4 - 420
0.3 - 460
0.2 - 520
0.1 - 625
0.05 - 735
0.02 - 870
Key
t time duration
Ute, max permissible effective touch voltage
IV. CIRCUITAL MODEL OF THE TRACTION
ELECTRIFICATION SYSTEM
In order to study fault currents and dangerous voltages, a
simplified steady-state model of the TES has been developed,
based on literature review and on experimental measurements.
In the following sections the models for rails, rectifier and
substation grounding system are presented. Finally a simplified
fault circuit is described.
A. Rails model
Rails can be modelled as a distributed parameters line
(Fig. 3), with a longitudinal resistance r and a shunt con-
ductance to ground g. For railway tracks with open formation,
many studies report typical values for the required parameters
[10], [11]. For rails with closed formation (typical of urban
traction systems) a few data can be gathered from literature
(some data can be found in [12] but the provided range
r
g/2 g/2
Fig. 3. Pi model of rails track.
TABLE II
RAIL TO GROUND CONDUCTANCE - MEASUREMENT RESULTS
Rail section Section length [m] g [S/km]
1 45 1.48
2 300 2.03
3 85 1.58
4 240 1.77
for g values is quite wide). The longitudinal parameter can
be evaluated knowing the cross section of the rails and the
resistivity of the constitutive material. For the rails in Turin,
it was calculated r = 0.013 Ω/km. For what concerns the
conductance to ground, four measurements were performed
on four short sections of rails, not used any more and dis-
connected from the rest of the network. For this reason, the
measurements were not performed with the methods suggested
by Standard EN 50122-2 in annexes A.3 and A.4 [6] but
with the fall of potential method, using two different voltage
sources: a DC generator and a square wave generator at
128 Hz. The results obtained with the two sources were in
good agreement and are summarized in Table II. The measured
values, with an average of g = 1.6S/km, are compatible with
the reference limit value provided by Standard EN 50122-2
(g ≤ 2.5S/km) [6] and are included in the range provided in
[12] (1 S/km ≤ g ≤ 10 S/km).
For the study of the ground faults in the substation and
along the line, it is also important to evaluate the equivalent
ground resistance Rtg of all the city-wide tracks network;
the rails and negative cables constitute in fact, as previously
described, a unique meshed city-wide network. The value
of Rtg changes depending on the considered point and is
difficult to evaluate. It is however possible to estimate a range
in which Rtg should be included. For the purposes of this
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Fig. 4. Transformer-rectifier steady-state characteristic.
study,based on considerations on the rails network structure
and on the previously described pi section model, it was
estimated 0.02Ω ≤ Rtg ≤ 0.2Ω. In the equivalent fault circuit,
the city-wide tracks network is therefore represented by the
parameter Rtg .
B. Transformer and rectifier model
For the study presented in this paper, we are interested in
the calculation of the steady-state values of fault currents. The
steady-state model of the transformer and rectifier group has
been determined by means of an analytic study, experimen-
tal measurements in a substation and numerical simulations
(Fig. 4).
As we are considering ground faults, both in the substation
and along the line, that are high impedance faults, the rectifier
is always working in the first (linear) part of the characteristic,
with relatively high voltages and low currents.
In order to calculate the steady state value of the fault cur-
rent, the transformer/rectifier group can therefore be modeled
as a Thevenin equivalent.
The equivalent voltage source has been set as the rated open
circuit voltage determined through the analytic study and the
simulations: Veq = 635 V .
The equivalent series resistance has been instead determined
through the experimental measurements carried out in a sub-
station: Req = 0.0167 Ω. The measured equivalent resistance
was higher than the theoretical one.
Summing up, for the transformer and rectifier model, the
choice was to use a simple Thevenin equivalent, where Veq
is the rated open circuit voltage, while Req is the measured
resistance.
C. Substation grounding system
The grounding system of the substations is constituted by
a typical configuration of a ring electrode with four rods.
The typical ground resistance can vary in the range from
5 Ω to 15 Ω depending on the soil characteristics. However,
the grounding system of each substation is connected to the
neighbouring ones by means of the MV cables sheaths and,
in Turin, of bare conductors buried in contact with the soil
TABLE III
SUMMARY OF MODEL PARAMETERS
Parameter Value range
Veq 635 V
Req 0.0167 Ω
Rsg 0.06 Ω
Rtg 0.02 Ω ÷ 0.2 Ω
R− 1.7 · 10−4 Ω ÷ 1.7 · 10−3 Ω
R+ 1.7 · 10−4 Ω ÷ 1.7 · 10−3 Ω
Rocs 0 Ω ÷ 0.1 Ω
Req
R+ Rocs
Vehicle
Veq
Rsg
R-
Rtg
Substation
Ground fault
in substation
Ground fault
along line
A
B C
Fig. 5. Fault circuit and fault currents.
together with MV cables [13]. For this reason, the equivalent
ground resistance that can be measured from each substation
is mostly independent from the ground resistance of the single
substation and from the distance between them: it has a typical
value around Rsg = 0.06 Ω [14].
D. Fault circuit
Having defined the simplified models for the different
components of the system, it is possible to draw the equivalent
circuit for the ground fault in the substation or along the
line (Fig. 5). In the figure, R−, R+ and Rocs represent,
respectively, the resistance of the negative cables from the
substation to the rails, of the positive feeder cable from the
substation to the OCS and the resistance of the overhead line.
The ranges for the values of the different parameters are
summarized in Table III.
The AC side of the system (distribution network and pri-
mary windings of the transformer) are not represented in the
equivalent circuit, as the fault currents can circulate only on
the DC side.
V. RESULTS
Currents and voltages have been calculated on the simplified
circuit, varying the different parameters in the ranges that have
been presented in the previous sections.
In the case of ground fault in the substation, the fault current
IF is injected into the ground through Rsg and flows through
Rtg and the negative conductors back to the rectifier (red
dashed line in Fig. 5). In the case of ground fault along the line,
instead, the fault current flows to the ground through the fault
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Fig. 6. Ground fault in the substation - results.
and flows back to the substation through the ground resistance
of the rails network Rtg , without involving the grounding
system of the substation, because the negative cables are not
connected to it, in order to limit the stray currents dispersed
by the rails into the ground in normal operation (green dash-
dot line in Fig. 5). It was noticed that the value of the current
absorbed by vehicles (i.e. the pre-fault condition) does not
affect considerably the results of the study. The same remarks
are valid for the length of the negative and positive cables:
the variation of the value of R− and R+ does not affect
considerably the results. The main parameters which instead
influence the fault current magnitude and the voltages are the
resistance Rtg of the rails network and the resistance Rocs of
the OCS.
In Fig. 6 a summary of the results for the ground fault in
the substation is presented. The fault current can be compared
with the settings of the over-current protection to see if it
will trip: typical settings of over-current protections are in the
range from 3000A to 4500A, marked with the green vertical
lines in Fig. 6. On the left side of the vertical lines the circuit
breaker trips, while on the right side it does not, as it does
not recognize the fault current, leaving dangerous voltages on
the ECPs and between ECPs and return conductors inside the
substation. Dangerous voltages are also present on the rails,
accessible to the public. The conventional limit of 120 V for
long-term conditions (to be considered if the circuit breaker
does not recognize the fault, see Table I) is in fact highlighted
in the figure with the horizontal red line and for all the range
of possible values of Rtg the analysed voltages are above this
limit. The voltages being discussed, and presented in Fig. 6
and in the following ones, are identified with the subscripts:
A for ECPs, B for the negative conductors in the substation
and C for rails. The measurement points are highlighted in
Fig. 5 with blue probes.
Also the ground fault along the line has been studied. Two
different cases are analysed: a ground fault along the line
near the substation and a ground fault along the line far from
the substation. In particular in the second case, the resistance
of the OCS contributes to the limitation of the fault current,
making it difficult for the over-current protection to recognize
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the fault. The two analysed cases are presented in Fig. 7 and
Fig. 8.
Following the same scheme described before for the ground
fault in the substation, we have highlighted also in Fig. 7 and
Fig. 8 the typical setting range of the over-current protections
(green vertical lines) and the maximum permissible effective
touch voltage (horizontal red line). In the case of fault along
the line, if the fault is close to the substation, the fault currents
are higher than in the case of ground fault in the substation, as
they are not limited by the ground resistance Rsg (Fig. 7). In
case instead the fault is far from the substation, as previously
said, the resistance of the OCS strongly limits the fault current.
In particular in this case, there are again situations in which
the fault current is not big enough for being recognized by
the over-current protections, and dangerous voltages can last
for a long time on the rails and inside the substation between
negative conductors and ECPs.
It is interesting to analyse the effect of the variation of the
two main parameters, Rtg and Rocs, at the same time, on the
fault current magnitude and on the rail potential, in case of
ground fault along the line.
Fig. 9 shows a 3D representation of the variation of the
fault current as a function of Rtg and Rocs. If we assume an
average setting of the over-current protection of 4000 A, the
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circuit breaker will not trip if the fault is in the lower (red)
area of the 3D plot. For all the other combinations of Rtg and
Rocs, the circuit breaker will instead detect the fault.
Fig. 10 presents instead a 3D representation of the variation
of the rail potential as a function of Rtg and Rocs. The 3D plot
shows that there is only a small portion of the variation range,
the lowest part, coloured in blue, where the rail potential is
below the safety limit of 120 V .
It is interesting, at this point, to put together the pieces of
information provided separately by Fig. 9 and Fig. 10. For
this purpose, the two colour plots, projected on the Rtg-Rocs
plane, are superimposed exploiting transparency. The result of
the combination of the two figures is presented in Fig. 11.
By comparing the fault current magnitude with the setting of
the over-current protection and the rail potential with the safety
limit, it is possible to identify three different areas, highlighted
by the coloured borders in Fig. 11:
• the small area at the top left, surrounded by the green
dotted line, where the over-current protection recognizes
the fault (IF > 4000A), and therefore the circuit-breaker
trips, even if no dangerous voltages are present because
the rail potential VC is below 120 V ;
• the area on the left, surrounded by the orange dashed
line, where dangerous voltages are present because the
rail potential VC is above 120 V and the circuit breaker
trips because the fault current is above the setting of the
over-current protection (IF > 4000 A);
• the big area on the right, surrounded by the red solid
line, where the rail potential is above the safety limit
(VC > 120 V ), but the circuit breaker will not trip, as
the fault current is too small to be detected by the over-
current protection (IF < 4000 A).
Analysing in particular the third area, the one surrounded
by the red solid line, it is clear that, in particular in case the
ground fault along the line happens far from the substation,
dangerous voltages can last for long periods on the rails, ac-
cessible to the public, without any tripping of the protections.
For what concerns instead the second area, where dangerous
voltages are present but the circuit breaker trips clearing the
fault, safety is guaranteed by the interruption time of the extra-
rapid DC circuit breaker. It can be noticed, in fact, that the
maximum rail potential is lower than 600 V (Fig. 10). The
maximum associated time duration is therefore 0.1s (Table I).
The maximum allowed time duration can be compared with
the interruption time Ti of the circuit breaker, that in general
depends on the prospective fault current and on the time
constant of the circuit. A detailed analysis of high speed DC
circuit breakers behavior is provided in [15].
The manufacturer of the extra-rapid circuit breakers in-
stalled in Turin, provides a plot of Ti against the initial rate
of rise of the current, that is reported in Fig. 12 [16].
From this plot it can be seen that the interruption time Ti
guaranteed by the extra-rapid DC circuit breaker is in the range
10 ms ≤ Ti ≤ 40 ms, depending on the fault current initial
rate of rise dIF /dt. This range of interruption times, which is
also compatible with the results of the simulations presented
in [15], guarantees the safety of people.
VI. CONCLUSION
If only over-current protections are adopted, in urban rail
traction systems potentially dangerous situations can be orig-
inated. In fact, the ground fault currents can be lower than
the protection settings, both for ground faults inside the
substations and for ground faults outside the substations, along
the line. In these cases dangerous voltages can last for a long
time on the rails, accessible to the public, and inside the
substations, on exposed conductive parts and between exposed
conductive parts and negative conductors. It is therefore of
utmost importance that innovative relays are installed and
properly set, in order to recognize short circuit currents from
normal operation ones.
The analysis that is presented in this paper has been
performed considering a negligible fault impedance. In case
the fault impedance is not negligible, the fault current could
be even smaller, and therefore more difficult to be detected by
common over-current protections.
One partial provision that could improve safety, even if not
totally sufficient, would be the installation of a voltage limiting
device (VLD), which connects the grounding system of the
substation with the negative conductors in case the voltage
between them is above a certain threshold. This provision
7VC < 120 V  and  IF > 4000 A VC > 120 V  and  IF > 4000 A VC > 120 V  and  IF < 4000 A
Fig. 11. Fault current IF and rail potential VC for a ground fault along the line.
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rate-of-rise.
would certainly be beneficial for the ground fault in the
substation, as it would transform the ground fault in a short
circuit, enabling the over-current protection to detect the fault
and trip, but would be partially beneficial also for the ground
fault along the line. It would in fact put the equivalent ground
resistance of the substation Rsg in parallel with the equivalent
ground resistance Rtg of all the city-wide tracks network,
increasing the fault current and making it more likely to be
detected.
If, on the contrary, the fault current is detected by the relay,
the extra-rapid DC circuit breaker completes the interruption
in a time shorter than the time allowed by the Standards.
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